No miner currently has more than 25%, so for every block the biggest one mines, 3 other blocks are found. In the current composition of ethereum pools, this is a bit impossible. In eth where block times are very short, you need to have mined already at the very least block 780 while not having broadcast your secretly mined blocks from 777 to 780 to have any chance of other miners caring about what you say because now you have a longer chain. You can’t just broadcast a new block and claim this is actually 777 because no one thinks so. This is now not first seen, but all seen. The chain-tip, or the last block lets say 777, in a normal situation is what everyone is working upon. If two blocks are broadcast at the same time, then variance decides with blocks sometime found within a second and sometime 30 seconds. The first block broadcast is the first seen and the one everyone builds on. The blockchain consensus works on first seen. A Battle of Timesįor a miner to really do any such re-org, they would be battling time and that is a very difficult thing. Where some time sensitive defi aspects are concerned, a block reorg can mean gains disappear, or losses, with the opportunities here endless but only if it’s possible to achieve such block reorganizations. Where ordinary ethereans are concerned in making transactions to Coinbase, their own wallet, or other ordinary transactions, this new client changes nothing because you just wait for more confirmations. There’s a debate now among defi-ers following the release of the repo with some expressing concern regarding the potential chaos such new incentives for block organizing can cause.
#Mev time bandit code
This new proposed client gives this broadcasting capability, this backchannel to miners, where anyone can through code tell all miners if fork then $$$. Leet spends all day looking at new broadcasted smart contracts through his reader bot and on spotting this opportunity he broadcasts to miners through the bandit client a reward of $2 million if they fork the flashloan block and work instead on a block that contains his contract, with the miner bot thus needing to do only one job, instead of the whole thing. Instead of building on top of that $5 million block, the miner can orphan it through a new block that includes his broadcasted $5 million flashloan contract. One example might be the $5 million flashloan. This transaction re-ordering is how far matters have gone, but a new MEV Uncle Bandit Geth repo suggests taking it further so that there’s a block reordering as well.
Instead of increasing the gas fee, they can choose to not include the normie transaction in a mined block, including instead their own transaction that extracts value. The miner bot himself can do a lot more here if coded so, as some pools have like Etherchain. Leet sees it, sends a smart contract template that says buy the meme token to increase the ask price and then sell it again to the normie at a higher price, with this front running facilitated by increasing the gas fee paid to the miner, thus Leet gets included while Normie doesn’t, something of a protocolarized ‘bribe.’ The simplest example is Normie wants meme token and sends the transaction. Miner Extractable Value (MEV) is a new underground frontier that plays with blockchain’s time for profit, especially in the new alternative financial services defi space. Let’s now have Leet ask in an if/then manner in an automated way that lets the miner bot instantly know just as they start working on a block they have the opportunity to gain 10x or 100x or even 1000x by orphaning. Miners know they will be handsomely rewarded, but do they take the chance? Says: hacked, do whatever it takes to orphan block 666. He has ten minutes, in that period he taps into a miners backchannel. Leet finds out right at the moment the bitcoin block is mined of the hack. Instead they want the certainty that the block they find has a worthy reward, rather than it being a worthless orphan or in eth a less worthy uncle. If another chain has even the slightest chance of being the longest, that’s where they go because it makes no difference to them which chain is the longest to the point they’d want to speculate on a shorter one. They take the course of least resistance and thus least risk.
Ultimately however the block reward is sufficient for miners to avoid any speculative games. There are many what ifs here, analyzed over the years, including what if he doesn’t switch and is lucky enough to get two blocks in a race of sorts with the other chain.
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